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In this research note, we propose studying a new trend of Europeanisation in national 
parliaments within the European Union (EU). We argue that further integration, combined 
with the opportunities and challenges presented by the Lisbon Treaty and the financial 
crisis, created pressure on national parliaments to expand the scrutiny process beyond 
European Affairs Committees (EACs). In this new phase of Europeanisation, parliaments 
are increasingly ‘mainstreaming’ EU affairs scrutiny, blurring the distinction between 
national and European policies and involving larger numbers of MPs. Following a review 
of existing research on the Europeanisation of national parliaments in the post-Lisbon era, 
we propose studying four dimensions of mainstreaming: the rising involvement of sectoral 
committees in European affairs; the adaptation of parliamentary staff to EU policy-making; 
the growing salience of European affairs in plenary debates and increasing inter-
parliamentary co-operation beyond European affairs specialists. We argue that this trend 
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has significant implications for research that studies the roles of national parliaments in the 
democratic functioning of the EU. 
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National parliaments have traditionally struggled to scrutinize European Union (EU) 
affairs effectively. The erosion of the unanimity principle in the Council of Ministers and 
informational imbalances between national executives and legislatures have further 
complicated effective control over national executives (Norton, 1996; O’Brennan and 
Raunio, 2007). National parliaments themselves have only started to counteract these 
developments relatively late in the process, and many parliaments initially proved either 
unwilling or unable to gain a measure of influence over their governments (Maurer and 
Wessels, 2001).  
           From the early 2000s onwards, scholarship focused on the Europeanisation of 
national parliaments, i.e. the top-down impact of European integration on the functioning 
of parliaments1 (e.g., Raunio and Hix, 2000; Dimitrakopoulos, 2001; Auel and Benz, 2005; 
Raunio and Wiberg, 2009). This literature has tended to emphasize parliaments’ efforts 
and adaptation to combat the deparliamentarisation phenomenon, with Winzen, for 
example, arguing that the strength of national parliaments overall increased from 2000 to 
2010 (Winzen, 2012: 663-5).2 Many of these studies focused in particular on the role of 
European Affairs Committees (EACs) in empowering parliaments to scrutinize EU affairs 
(e.g. Dimitrakopoulos, 2001; Bergman et al., 2003; Auel, 2005). 
However, we have recently observed changes in the organization of EU affairs 
scrutiny which suggest that a second phase of Europeanisation of national parliaments has 
started: one that sees a diffusion of European affairs scrutiny responsibilities to a wider 
range of actors away from their centralisation in EU affairs committees. This trend is called 
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‘decentralisation’ by Dutch practitioners (van Keulen, 2012; Tweede Kamer, 2006: 23-24) 
and ‘mainstreaming’ in the UK context (Carter and McLeod, 2006; House of Commons 
European Scrutiny Committee, 2013). ‘Mainstreaming’ refers to the idea that a certain type 
of policy (EU affairs) is not to be treated in isolation, but is increasingly integrated into the 
work of parliaments in all policy sectors. We argue that it concerns all types of 
parliamentary actors, including parliamentary committees, political parties, individual 
legislators and support staff. However, the concept of mainstreaming is not yet subject to 
research on the Europeanisation of national parliaments.  
In this research note, we argue that there is considerable pressure for mainstreaming 
which necessitates the study of this new process in legislative research. In the first section, 
we discuss the factors that have led to this trend, as well as possible explanations for the 
variation in the speed and extent to which parliaments mainstream. In the second section, 
we provide an overview of recent research on the Europeanisation of national parliaments 
and derive implications for the study of mainstreaming. We argue that the trend towards 
mainstreaming affects in particular four dimensions for parliamentary scrutiny – the 
involvement of different types of committees, participation in inter-parliamentary 
cooperation (IPC), the organization of staff support and participation in plenary debates – 
which are then discussed in the context of the existing empirical evidence. The final section 
discusses the implications of this trend for future research on the Europeanisation of 
national parliaments. 
 
THE PRESSURES FOR MAINSTREAMING 
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For decades, the trend among parliaments has been to delegate the scrutiny of EU affairs 
to a clearly defined group of people represented in EACs (Raunio, 1999). So why are we 
now observing a trend towards mainstreaming? The change in trends can best be 
understood through a historical institutionalist approach that perceives the trend toward 
mainstreaming as a process, situating different parliaments at varying stages of that process 
in ways that reflect their particular domestic contexts. It relies on a broad definition of 
institutions that encompasses both formal rules and structures and informal but widely-
accepted practices (Rosamond, 2000: 114; Hall and Taylor, 1996: 938). This breadth is 
particularly useful in the study of national parliaments, enabling us to refer not only to the 
formal powers and roles assigned to them by national constitutions, but also to the political 
parties and individual parliamentarians operating within them and to the informal practices 
embedded in their daily operations.  
In light of this framework, we can identify three main external pressures for 
spreading European affairs scrutiny outside the confines of specialised EACs that create a 
turning point for national parliaments. The first and longest-term major driver of 
mainstreaming derives from the general trend toward greater EU involvement in an ever-
larger number of policy areas. This was expanded and codified in the Treaty of Lisbon, but 
has its roots in a broader and more gradual process that began to accelerate with the Single 
European Act. Most aspects of domestic policy now have a European dimension, meaning 
that the distinction between ‘domestic’ and ‘European’ policies has become blurred. For 
parliaments, effective scrutiny of EU affairs now requires the mobilisation of expertise 
across an ever-larger range of issues and policy areas. This puts the capacity of EACs to 
deal with all EU matters under pressure.  
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 The second, more proximate, pressure for mainstreaming derives from the Treaty 
of Lisbon’s provisions on enhancing the roles of national parliaments, especially the Early 
Warning System (EWS). If national parliaments feel that an EU legislative proposal 
breaches the principle of subsidiarity, they can now issue reasoned opinions to put the 
Commission under pressure to revise or withdraw the proposal. However, issuing reasoned 
opinions to the Commission, coordinating with other parliaments in the EWS, and coping 
with the volume of information that parliaments now receive on EU affairs requires a 
significant commitment of resources, including both time and administrative support. This 
again puts a great strain on the capacity of EACs to scrutinize European affairs on their 
own.  
 Finally, from 2008 onwards, the global financial crisis, the Eurozone crisis and the 
measures taken to combat them have also significantly increased the political salience of 
the EU in national parliaments, particularly within the Eurozone. Questions regarding 
‘bailout’ packages for struggling countries have become paramount in both rescued 
countries and rescuers, as austerity budgets have drawn protest in parts of Europe and 
support in others. As a result, the distinction between ‘national’ and ‘European’ politics 
has become ever more blurred, with even mainstream parties – as opposed to explicitly 
Eurosceptic groups – fighting elections with explicit reference to European-level issues 
(e.g. Francois Hollande’s promise to re-negotiate the fiscal compact). The need to slash 
budgets to comply with EU rules even caused the collapse of the Dutch government in 
2012, striking at the heart of supposedly ‘domestic’ political life. In this context, there is 
pressure for a larger number of parliamentarians to be aware of EU issues in order to 
respond to the concerns of their constituents.  
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 Moreover, the willingness and ability of national parliaments to mainstream EU 
affairs scrutiny are heavily conditioned by their existing procedures, resources, party-
political dynamics and institutional cultures. Historical institutionalism, in particular, 
allows for a temporal dimension that can perceive the trend toward mainstreaming as a 
process, situating different parliaments at varying stages of that process in ways that reflect 
their particular domestic contexts. The broad definition of institutions employed by 
historical institutionalism allows it to draw on both a ‘calculus approach’ – i.e. a rational-
choice paradigm – and a ‘cultural approach’ emphasising the so-called ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ to understanding actor behaviour in the context of institutions  
(Rosamond, 2000: 114; Hall and Taylor, 1996: 938; Armstrong and Bulmer, 1998).  
 The first disincentive to mainstreaming relates to cost, in terms of both resources 
and time. Sectoral committees in many countries already consider themselves to have a full 
workload, and are likely to resent being asked to take on additional responsibilities unless 
accompanied by significant increases in resources. For example, van Keulen (2012) has 
highlighted that a major lesson of the Dutch case – one of the pioneers of mainstreaming – 
has been that sectoral committees have required both training and support for 
mainstreaming to work effectively. Mainstreaming also demands extensive cooperation 
between committees and groups of engaged parliamentarians (MPs) – between the EAC 
and sectoral committees, for example. Especially in the early phases, EACs may be 
reluctant to cede competences to other committees, as this may affect their status. 
 A second factor influencing the relative speed with which parliaments choose to 
mainstream scrutiny relates to the political salience of EU issues. This may be affected by 
two elements. Although the financial crisis has generally increased the visibility of EU 
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affairs (see Saurugger, 2014), there remain several countries in which the effect of the crisis 
has been more limited – for example because they are outside the Eurozone (e.g. the UK). 
In such cases, we expect the pressure for mainstreaming to be less in ‘creditor’ states like 
Germany or (former) ‘debtor’ states like Ireland and Greece, where the Eurozone crisis has 
permeated almost all aspects of national policy, including domestic party politics. In 
addition, the degree of pro-Europeanness of important MPs may play a role, as scrutiny of 
EU affairs may be regarded as unnecessary or because the EU remains overwhelmingly 
popular and thus is not seen as deserving of significant scrutiny (Raunio, 1999: 190).  
 The final major disincentive to mainstreaming relates specifically to parliaments in 
which existing scrutiny procedures, though centralised in the EAC, are already perceived 
as highly effective. The Danish Folketing, for example, is regularly cited as one of the EU’s 
‘strongest’ parliaments; scrutiny work there remains largely concentrated in the EAC 
(Winzen, 2012: 666). In cases like these, where the parliament in question considers itself 
to be very effective in controlling and monitoring its government and European legislation 
despite the relative lack of involvement of sectoral committees, we expect the costs of 
reform to outweigh the perceived benefits, at least for the foreseeable future. By contrast, 
mainstreaming will be easier to achieve when a parliament seeks to play a stronger role in 
EU affairs but is dissatisfied with the current committee system, which was, for example, 





RESEARCH TRENDS IN THE FIELD OF EUROPEANISATION OF NATIONAL 
PARLIAMENTS 
The phenomenon of mainstreaming has thus far not been subject to any study that 
investigates EU affairs scrutiny by national parliaments. Europeanisation is nevertheless a 
prominent theme. Inspired by meta-analyses in the field of Europeanisation (e.g., Machill 
et al., 2006; Exadaktylos and Radaelli, 2009), we provide a qualitative analysis of trends 
in research on the Europeanisation of national parliaments. For this, we selected 22 studies 
through searching the Web of Science and Google Scholar by the keywords 
“Europeani$ation” AND “national parliaments”. In order to be selected, studies had to be 
published in English-speaking, peer-reviewed journals in the field of political science or 
public administration. Peer-review ensures high quality and articles in English infer a high 
reach within the academic community. We decided that (parts of) the time period of 
investigation had to be post-Lisbon in order to identify recent trends and thus focus on 
articles that have been published between 1 January 2010 and 31 July 2015. Furthermore, 
we disregarded theoretical reflections or literature reviews and solely selected explicitly 
empirical studies. The empirical approach had to be systematic and the research design 
comparative in order for us to draw inferences about Europeanisation trends across national 
parliaments.  
[Table 1 about here] 
Table 1 provides an overview of the selected studies. We have identified the empirical 
focus of each study, their method(s) of analysis, as well the parliaments under study and 
the time period of investigation. Eight studies comprise national parliaments of all EU-27 
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member states, while the rest deals with a sub-selection of national parliaments, ranging 
from two to 26 chambers. Not least due to our selection criteria, we observe that two thirds 
of the studies explicitly respond to two of the main external pressures that we discussed 
above, that is either the new provisions by the Lisbon Treaty (eight articles) or the Eurozone 
crisis (three articles); three studies acknowledge both pressures. Furthermore, following 
our argumentation above (that EU affairs cannot be treated in isolation anymore given the 
interlinkage of domestic and European policy areas), we notice the breadth of policy areas 
covered by the studies: several articles represent case studies related to a variety of EU 
legislation (e.g., Foreign and Security Policy, migration law) or decision-making processes 
(e.g., regarding the first yellow card in the EWS, EU budgets), while others take a more 
inclusive approach as regards parliamentary activity and scrutiny.   
The articles are rather diverse in terms of empirical focus. Most articles deal with more 
specific forms of parliamentary scrutiny, such as by the issuing of reasoned opinions, 
mandates or resolutions as well as committee referrals or debates (11 articles), while four 
articles take a broader perspective of parliamentary oversight (Dörrenbächer et al., 2015; 
Huff, 2015; Jensen and Martinsen, 2015; Peters et al., 2014) and Strelkov (2015) 
investigates the relationships between parliamentary committees, parties and 
administrators in EU affairs scrutiny. Inter-parliamentary co-operation and coordination as 
well as the role of parliamentary administrations are subject to four articles. Lastly, two 
articles propose indices that measure parliamentary control (Karlas, 2012; Winzen, 2012). 
Overall, the articles focus on various parliamentary actors: committees, parliamentary 
parties and administrators. We argue that mainstreaming implies an increasing 
involvement of parliamentary actors beyond European affairs specialists. We should 
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therefore also consider individual MPs when assessing the extent to which mainstreaming 
takes place inside national parliaments.  
This brings us to the question: in what way would parliamentary actors become affected if 
we were to witness mainstreaming trends inside national parliaments? We propose that 
parliamentary actors are likely to be particularly affected by mainstreaming in four 
dimensions of parliamentary scrutiny. Since we understand the diffusion of responsibilities 
in EU affairs as a shift away from EACs, the first dimension concerns the growing number 
of sectoral committees and their members dealing with European affairs scrutiny, such as 
by issuing reports or opinions, and thereby describes ‘decentralisation’ processes. As this 
poses considerable strain on the administrative support system, the second dimension 
encompasses growing mainstreaming of EU affairs scrutiny at the administrative level. Our 
third dimension considers all parliamentary actors, namely administrators, parliamentary 
committees, political parties and other groups of MPs – for all of them we should witness 
increasing levels of inter-parliamentary co-operation and coordination. As a fourth 
dimension, we propose that mainstreaming can also be observed in the gradual increase in 
the number of plenary debates focusing on European issues because diffusion of 
responsibilities also means that more parliamentarians become involved in the scrutiny of 
EU affairs on a regular basis. Contrary to the other three dimensions, by which 
parliamentary scrutiny takes place behind closed doors, this one falls under open scrutiny 
of national parliaments in European affairs. Based on our selection of existing research, we 




MANIFESTATIONS OF THE MAINSTREAMING OF EU AFFAIRS SCRUTINY 
Although recent studies have not addressed our particular question as to whether we see an 
emerging trend towards mainstreaming of EU affairs within national parliaments, there is 
early evidence of mainstreaming affecting at least four main dimensions of parliamentary 
scrutiny, namely: the rising involvement of sectoral committees in EU affairs scrutiny; the 
adaptation of parliamentary staff to EU policy-making; increasing IPC beyond European 
affairs specialists; and the growing salience of EU affairs in plenary debates. In the 
following we present the results of our meta-analysis with respect to each of the four 
dimensions. It is important to note that these results are tentative, since we rely on a variety 
of studies that have applied various methods and which differ in their scope (see Table 1). 
Most of them actually do not provide quantifiable, and thus comparable, indicators with 
which we can assess developments for all 27 or even 28 national parliaments. This is why 
we complement our analysis with quantitative data from other first or secondary sources, 
as provided in Table 2 below. In the last section we will propose ways about how to 
measure indicators of mainstreaming more systematically in future research.  
[Table 2 about here] 
 
As regards our first dimension, few existing studies have investigated the extent to which 
sectoral committees become increasingly involved in EU affairs at the expense of EACs 
over time. One exception is the study by Winzen (2012: 667), which shows that sectoral 
committees in the EU-9 member states have already become more and more and active in 
EU affairs scrutiny between 1973 and 2009. Others provide cross-sectional snapshots of 
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European affairs scrutiny for the time period after Lisbon. In this respect, Jensen and 
Martinsen (2015) analyse, among other things, the scrutiny of early agreements between 
the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament by sectoral committees. They show 
that sectoral committees are sometimes involved in the Danish Folketing and the British 
House of Commons, while the specialised EU subcommittees in the House of Lords as well 
as sectoral committees in both German chambers are highly involved in the scrutiny of 
early agreements.  
Karlas (2012) provides a more comprehensive overview of the extent to which EU 
affairs scrutiny has been decentralised by means of involving sectoral committees after 
Lisbon. His results for lower houses are reported in Table 2, column ‘Involvement in EU 
scrutiny’. Generally, only four out of 27 chambers, namely the Austrian Nationalrat, the 
Polish Sejm, the Romanian Camera as well as the Maltese Parliament have kept EU affairs 
scrutiny within the jurisdiction of EACs; 12 chambers occasionally involve sectoral 
committees, while the remaining 11 chambers do so on a regular basis. These findings also 
correspond with parliamentary scrutiny in specific policy areas. Huff (2015: 404), for 
instance, finds by expert interviews that the respective Foreign and Defence Committees 
of the Dutch Tweede Kamer and the Italian Camera are particularly active in the scrutiny 
of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common Security and Defence 
Policy, while the respective committees in the Polish Sejm and Danish Folketing hardly 
become involved. 
Another striking example is the process of drafting reasoned opinions as part of 
EWS. As shown in Table 2 (column ‘Involvement in drafting reasoned opinions’), almost 
two thirds of all parliaments involve sectoral committees to at least some extent in the 
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formulation of reasoned opinions. Some of them, among them the German, Swedish, and 
Luxembourgish parliaments even delegate this task entirely to sectoral committees. While 
we are unable to measure any trend over time, this indicator shows that some national 
parliaments have particularly responded to the new provisions of the Lisbon Treaty by 
involving their sectoral committees more actively. The column ‘Recent strengthening of 
sectoral committees’ in Table 2 shows that some have strengthened their sectoral 
committees after Lisbon, others even before the new treaty came into force, perhaps in 
anticipation of the new political and legal developments.  
Regarding our second dimension, parliamentary practice suggests that the 
administrative support system plays an important advisory function in most European 
parliaments today (Högenauer and Neuhold, 2015; van Keulen, 2012). As sectoral 
committees now increasingly require advice on EU policies and procedures, the result has 
been growing mainstreaming of EU affairs scrutiny at the administrative level. It can take 
a variety of forms, including specialised EU-staff amongst all committee staff (as in the 
case of the Dutch Tweede Kamer or the Swedish Riksdag) or of a sufficiently large common 
EU unit with staff who specialise in different EU policy areas (e.g. the Danish Folketing, 
the German Bundestag or the Luxemburgish Chamber of Representatives) (Högenauer and 
Christiansen, 2015). Less resource-intensive options for mainstreaming include a simple 
transfer of EU support tasks to ‘ordinary’ committee staff who will have to accept that 
European issues are part of the work of their sectoral committees (e.g., the Dutch Eerste 
Kamer, Högenauer, 2015), or putting existing EAC staff in charge of advising sectoral 
committees on EU affairs (e.g., the Belgian Senate, cf. Högenauer and Neuhold, 2015). As 
the column entitled ‘Staff support for sectoral committees’in Table 2 shows, even among 
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those parliaments that have delegated the competence for EU affairs scrutiny wholly, or in 
part, to sectoral committees, there are still many cases in which only the EAC has EU 
experts at its disposal. Mainstreaming has thus progressed less far in the second dimension 
compared to the first dimension. 
Our third dimension – IPC – has been particularly encouraged by the Lisbon Treaty 
and other new legal provisions. Prior to Lisbon, COSAC (‘Conference of Parliamentary 
Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union’) played a central 
role. Over recent years, new, informal and formalised forms of IPC have been established 
between parliamentary committees, political parties and other groups of MPs (for an 
overview, see Hefftler and Gattermann, 2015). Although Herranz-Surrallés (2014: 958) 
argues that inter-parliamentary relations in the field of foreign and security policy ‘have 
become less structured and more strained’, Peters et al. (2014) find that MPs appreciated 
formal as well as informal ways of IPC for their networking opportunities and information 
exchange regarding the EU’s anti-piracy mission Atalanta. Moreover, there is evidence 
that mainstreaming of IPC takes place at the general level of inter-parliamentary exchange. 
As shown in Table 2 (column ‘Involvement by sectoral committees’), Gattermann (2013) 
observes increased participation of non-EU specialists from national parliaments, since 
generally more MPs from sectoral committees, rather than EAC members, have 
participated in interparliamentary committee meetings in Brussels between 2009 and 2012. 
Only members of sectoral committees from the British House of Lords are seldom 
involved, which might be explained by the fact that the respective EAC consists of several 
specialised EU sub-committees. Moreover, Table 2 (column ‘Liaison officers in Brussels’) 
shows that most national parliaments also cooperate on the administrative level in the post-
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Lisbon era. Neuhold and Högenauer (forthcoming) find that the number of liaison officers 
in Brussels has steadily increased since 1991, when the Danish Folketing installed the first 
officer in Brussels. According to them, liaison officers are particularly important for the 
information exchange between parliaments. The network of national parliament 
representatives in Brussels, for instance, also played a major role in the coordination of the 
first yellow card within the EWS (Cooper, 2015), which suggests that they continue to be 
an indicator for mainstreaming in the dimension of IPC in the future. Thus far, however, 
we find little evidence for IPC at the party level post-Lisbon, although research has 
identified them as key players in EU affairs scrutiny (Finke and Herbel, 2015; Strelkov, 
2015) and acknowledges the importance of transnational party networks in the case of 
Atalanta (Peters et al., 2014: 443)  
Our last dimension concerns the growing salience of European affairs in plenary 
debates. Bergmann et al. (2003: 175) show that before the Nice Treaty came into force in 
2003 plenary meetings were hardly used for European affairs scrutiny in the EU-15. 
However, we expect the Lisbon Treaty to have triggered a shift in responsibilities over 
European affairs in national parliaments. For instance, following the introduction of the 
EWS, we find that in most cases the plenary formally adopts reasoned opinions as shown 
in the column ‘Reasoned opinions adopted by plenary’ in Table 2. This also implies that 
debates precede the adoption by the plenary. This is particularly the case for the French 
and Polish Senate as well as in both chambers of the Spanish Parliament (Legislative 
Dialogue Unit of the European Parliament, 2013). However, even though the plenaries of 
16 chambers are ‘always’ responsible for the adoption of reasoned opinions, the low use 
of this instrument in practice does not necessarily infer frequent debates of EU legislative 
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proposals, except perhaps for the most active chambers in the EWS, including the Swedish 
Riksdag, the French Senate and the Dutch Tweede Kamer (Gattermann and Hefftler, 2015).  
Plenary debates take place in public with direct access by the media and citizens, 
which means that both mainstreaming processes and the parliamentary scrutiny of EU 
affairs are likely to become more visible to the public. Yet, the last column of Table 2 
shows that there is considerable variation among parliaments: only a few make very active 
use of debates, but there are still many in which EU affairs are side-lined. These data are 
provided by Auel et al. (2015b), on which Auel and her co-authors in the three above-cited 
studies all rely (see Table 1). By contrast, in his two-country comparison between 2000 
and 2010, De Ruiter (2013, 2015) shows that there are numerically more references to EU 
directives in plenary debates in the UK than in the Netherlands. This is also reflected by 
the use of debates in both upper houses by the evidence presented in Table 2. However, the 
data of Auel et al. (2015b) suggest that EU affairs are less frequently debated in the House 
of Commons than in the Dutch Tweede Kamer.  
Furthermore, we also find other kinds of indicators for a potential mainstreaming 
trend in the qualitative analyses of parliamentary debates and party positions. These can be 
generally understood as increasing awareness for EU-level decisions, including financial 
and fiscal issues (Puntscher Riekmann and Wydra, 2013), or EU migration law 
(Dörrenbächer et al., 2015). In particular, De Wilde (2012) contends that politicisation over 
the EU budget has the potential to alleviate the ‘constraining dissensus’ in national 
parliaments; and Maatsch (2014) shows that the Eurozone crisis has led some 
parliamentary parties in debtor countries to alter their political ideology regarding their 
positions towards anti-crisis measures.  
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Taken together, the early evidence suggests a greater involvement of committees, support 
staff, political parties and ultimately MPs in European affairs. However, the extent of 
mainstreaming varies greatly both across parliaments and across dimensions. Table 2 
illustrates that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to mainstreaming. This poses a 
challenge for researchers – and especially comparativists, as these diverse approaches 
ought to be factored into attempts to measure ‘level of activity’ or ‘strength’ across 
parliaments.  
 
A NEW TREND IN EUROPEANISATION – NEW CHALLENGES FOR 
RESEARCH? 
European integration has reached a point where the participation of national parliaments in 
EU affairs is not solely motivated by the growing transfer of competences to the European 
level. The Treaty of Lisbon has created new opportunities; the sovereign debt crisis has 
made at least some aspects of EU affairs politically and electorally salient. However, in 
line with historical institutionalism, we assume that national parliaments embrace 
mainstreaming depending on the presence of a number of intervening factors: time and 
resource costs, the political salience of European politics in that country, and perceived 
success of the existing system. There is variation between parliaments in the extent of 
mainstreaming and in the timing of mainstreaming. The Dutch parliament, for example, 
has made extensive reforms towards mainstreaming in 2006 (Högenauer 2015), whereas 
the Portuguese Assembleia da República only adopted moderate reforms in May 20123, by 
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which the EAC now explicitly shares competences in the scrutiny of European affairs with 
the plenary and other committees (Art. 6.1).  
Overall, the trend towards mainstreaming not only affects parliaments themselves, 
but also how research into the Europeanisation of parliaments and their activism in EU 
affairs scrutiny has to be designed. Comparativists are particularly affected, as one can no 
longer compare the powers and levels of activities of EACs: tasks that are being performed 
by EACs in one parliament may be performed by sectoral committees in other parliaments. 
However, in order to factor in mainstreaming in comparative studies of parliaments, more 
systematic approaches towards the extent of mainstreaming across parliaments in different 
elements of parliamentary scrutiny are needed. Thus, how can we measure mainstreaming 
within our four dimensions?  
As regards ‘decentralisation’ towards sectoral committees, one can begin by 
comparing the formal powers of these committees as specified in the rules of procedure. In 
addition, in order to measure their active involvement in practice, Raunio (2009: 326) 
suggests estimating the share of committee time spent on EU legislation to assess the 
degree of Europeanisation. Another study should investigate the number of EU issues on 
the agenda of sectoral committees, alongside the resources invested in scrutinising them 
(e.g. including invitations to government representatives and European politicians to report 
before the committee or hearings with experts). A closer look at their composition would 
also answer questions about whether a new group of cross-issue EU specialists is emerging. 
This could be accomplished by tracing the relationship between individual MPs’ career 
paths and legislative behaviour.   
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To measure the extent of mainstreaming in IPC, future research should trace the 
developments individually for each parliament over time. This provides information about 
who attends these meetings, how often and why. Ultimately, such research would 
determine whether (initial) non-EU specialists become involved more often in IPC, or 
whether the same faces show up every time, rendering European affairs accessible only to 
a few experts in national parliaments. Surveys would furthermore give insights about 
attendance at informal meetings and the individual motives of MPs to take part in IPC (see 
also Raunio, 2000; Miklin and Crum, 2011). Surveys and interviews could also provide 
answers regarding the mainstreaming of EU staff and assess whether and to what extent 
staff are specialised in specific policy areas. The extent to which mainstreaming affects the 
administrative level can also be studied by looking at the organisation or number of staff. 
In particular, one can assess whether sectoral committees have their own EU experts 
attached to them, or whether the main EU support unit contains staff that is explicitly in 
charge of supporting sectoral committees. . 
Lastly, a content analysis offers a key opportunity for the study of parliamentary 
debates enabling the assessment of cross-country, cross-issue and inter-temporal variation. 
A quantitative study could, for instance, investigate to what extent plenary debates deal 
with European affairs by proportional measures, and thereby assess the salience and 
visibility of EU issues (e.g., De Wilde, 2011); and which parliamentary actors become 
publicly active in European affairs, such as by asking parliamentary questions (e.g., see De 
Ruiter, 2014) to enquire whether we witness an increase in EU specialists across policy 
areas. A qualitative analysis would answer questions about the framing of European issues 
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or the tone of parliamentary actors towards the EU in debates (e.g., see Closa and Maatsch, 
2014).  
It is likely that the intensities to which mainstreaming in each of our four 
dimensions occurs are to some extent interlinked with each other. Even if they have formal 
powers, sectoral committees are less likely to become actively involved in EU affairs 
scrutiny if they are unable to draw on sufficient resources, i.e. support staff. As Högenauer 
and Christiansen (2015) show, not all parliaments have increased their staff following 
Lisbon. Similarly, in parliaments where the EAC has a strong institutionalised position, 
undermining the role of sectoral committees in European affairs scrutiny, the chances are 
lower that European affairs are frequently debated in plenary. Most EACs are granted the 
right to debate and vote on European issues on behalf of the whole parliament (see Raunio 
2009: 319). Thus, in parliaments where the EAC remains the central body for European 
affairs scrutiny, the likelihood of the plenary debating EU issues diminishes. As shown in 
Table 2, EU issues are prominent on the plenary agenda of, among others, the German 
Bundestag, whose sectoral committees have had an influence in EU affairs for a long time. 
Conversely, in the Slovakian National Council, where the EAC has a central status, EU 
issues are less frequently debated in the open chamber. 
 Moreover, there are examples in which mainstreaming has occurred only in certain 
areas. As Table 2 demonstrates, most MPs of the two Austrian chambers attending inter-
parliamentary committee meetings are from sectoral committees, despite the fact that – 
internally – EU affairs are still dealt with by the EAC. Conversely, the Belgian Senate has 
decentralised EU affairs scrutiny to the sectoral committees, but has too few EU staff to 
allow for specialisation on policy sectors (Högenauer and Neuhold, 2015). In sum, we 
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argue that mainstreaming has varying characteristics, which makes a better understanding 
of the transformations more urgent.  
 Overall, the effects of these changes on the functioning of parliaments are fairly 
extensive and change how the Europeanisation of parliaments and their scrutiny of EU 
affairs should be studied by academics. At the same time, the number of mainstreaming 
dimensions proposed in this article is not finite. There are activities outside the immediate 
parliamentary arena (and related to the communication function of parliaments and their 
members) that could also be affected by mainstreaming: most notably parliamentary 
election campaigns and constituency services of individual MPs. Parliamentarians who do 
not invest resources in becoming more involved in European affairs by means of their 
committee membership, via IPC or by contributions in plenary debates, are unlikely to fight 
electoral campaigns over European integration or exchange their views directly with their 
constituents. Conversely, those who are EU specialists in their national parliaments are 
constrained in their communication function if mainstreaming does not take place across 
parties and committees or in plenary debates.  
Hence, future research needs to take into account the changing organization of EU 
affairs scrutiny, both in the formulation of research questions, the choice of study design 
and the application of appropriate methods to study mainstreaming of EU affairs in national 
parliaments. In addition, as the findings of Miklin (2014) illustrate, researchers should be 
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Table 2: Early evidence of the mainstreaming of EU affairs inside national parliaments 
Dimension  Sectoral committees Administratio
n 
IPC Debates 































Austria U  No   Fully  Joint No Medium  
 L No  No   Highly  Joint No Medium  
Belgium U  Fully  No change EAC staff Highly  Yes Always Low  
 L Occasionally No, adopting only No change EAC staff Highly  Yes Sometime
s 
Low  
Bulgaria  Regularly  Consulted by EAC  since accession EAC staff, CU Highly  Yes No Low  
Cyprus  Occasionally No   Highly  Yes No Low  
Czech 
Republic 
U  No since accession EAC staff, CU Often  Yes Always High  




Denmark  Occasionally Highly  1994, 2011 CU, EU advisors Highly  Yes No Low  
Estonia  Regularly No   Highly  Yes Always Low  
Finland  Regularly No   Fully  Yes Always Medium  
France U  No, adopting only 2008 EAC staff Highly  No Sometime
s 
Low  
 L Regularly No, adopting only 2008 EAC staff Often  Yes Sometime
s 
Low  
Germany U  Fully  Incrementally Regional ministries Highly  Yes Usually  Low  
 L Regularly Fully  Incrementally CU Highly  Yes Usually  Medium  
Greece  Occasionally Jointly with EAC  NI NI Highly  Yes No Low  
Hungary  Regularly No   Highly  Yes Always Low  
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Ireland U  Consulted by EAC  2011 Own EU staff, CU Fully  Joint Always Low  
 L Occasionally Consulted by EAC  2011 Own EU staff, CU Highly  Joint Always Medium  
Italy U  Jointly with EAC 2006 CU Highly  Yes Sometime
s 
Medium  
 L Regularly No  NI CU Fully  Yes Sometime
s 
Low  
Latvia  Occasionally No   Highly  Yes No Low  
Lithuania  Regularly Consulted by EAC  since EWS None Highly  Yes Always Low  
Luxembourg  Regularly Fully 2005 CU Highly  Yes Usually Low  
Malta  No No   Highly  Yes NI   Low  
Netherlands U  Fully 2005-6 None Fully  Joint Always Low  
 L Regularly Consulted by EAC  2006 Own EU staff Highly  Joint Always Medium  
Poland U  Jointly with EAC  since EWS CU Highly  Yes Always Low  
 L No No   Highly  Yes Always Low  
Portugal  Occasionally Consulted by EAC  2010, 2013 None Highly  Yes Usually Low  
Romania U  Highly  since accession NI Fully  No NI   Low  
 L No Highly since accession CU Highly  Yes NI   Low  
Slovakia  Occasionally Consulted by EAC    Highly  Yes NI   Low  
Slovenia U  Consulted by EAC  2010 NI NI No Always Low  
 L Regularly Fully 2010 NI Highly  Yes Sometime
s 
Low  
Spain U  No   Fully  Yes Sometime
s 
Low  





Sweden  Occasionally Fully 1997, 2007 CU, own EU staff Fully  Yes Always Medium  
UK  U  No    Seldom  Yes Always Medium  
 L Occasionally No    Highly  Yes Always Low  
Notes:  
a based on Karlas (2012); upper houses were not assessed on this indicator.  
b
 based on a report of the Legislative Dialogue Unit of the European Parliament (2013); ‘highly’ involved means that the draft may be 
finalised by the EAC. 
c
 based on interviews and Hefftler et al. (2015); only compiled for those chambers where sectoral committees play a role 
d
 based on percentage of MPs from sectoral committees taking part in Brussels committee meetings, 2009-2012 (Gattermann, 2013); 
fully involved = 100%, highly =61-99%, often =31-60%, seldom =0-30% 
e
 based on Neuhold and Högenauer (forthcoming 2015) 
f based on the score for debates by Auel et al. (2015b). Low=activity score from 0 to 0.29; medium=0.3-0.59; high ≤0.6; the score 
takes into account the number and duration of plenary debates on EU issues, as well as the relative time spent debating EU issues. 
Abbreviations: L= lower house, U= upper house, CU= a central unit that serves all committees (e.g. a legal, research or information 






 As captured, for example, by Ladrech’s definition of Europeanisation as a top-down process whereby 
European ‘political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and 
policy-making’ (1994: 69). 
2
 Winzen (2012: 663-5) noted, however, that the pre-2004 Member States generally retained weaker 
scrutiny systems relative to those of new Member States.  
3
 Law no. 43/2006 of 25 August 2006, as amended by Law no. 21/2012 of 17 May 2012 (see 
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